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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY-OTHER CRIME EVIDENCE
Other Crime Evidence to Show Intent
Under what circumstances is it permissible to introduce other
crime evidence to show that a person charged with the instant crime
had the requisite intent? In the two-decade period immediately prior
to State v. Prieur,' the court often took a very relaxed attitude towards
the admissibility of other crime evidence Prieur reflected a firm re-
jection of this approach and an adoption of much more rigorous stan-
dards.
The holding of the court in the 1978 decision of State v. Morris3
is a good example of the stricter post-Prieur approach. The defen-
dant in Morris was charged with the murder of her child, and the
prosecution sought to introduce evidence of certain prior child beatings
by the same defendant. The majority of the court, speaking through
Justice Tate, phrased the question presented as follows:
[D]oes the circumstance that twice before the accused had beaten
two of her other children, on occasions respectively six and three
years prior to the present offense, tend to prove that she had
beaten the present child with the specific intent to kill or serious-
ly injure him? And, if so, does the probative, value of this other-
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The writers express apprecia-
tion to Dana Bourgeois, Hope Stephens, and Donald Trahan for their very able assistance
in the preparation of this article.
** Member, Louisiana Bar Association.
1. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973). For a general discussion of the issue of other crime
evidence, see G. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 30-51 (1974) & 73-113 (Supp. 1978).
2. For a discussion of the pre-Prieur cases, see the excellent Comment, Other
Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-To Show Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc., in the Case
in Chief, 33 LA. L. REV. 614 (1973), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 30 (1974).
An outstanding example of such a relaxed attitude was State v. Morris, 245 La.
475, 157 So. 2d 728 (1963), where to show the defendant had the required specific
intent to kill the victim in a barroom confrontation, the court upheld the admissibility
of a guilty plea by the defendant to the murder of another barroom patron in another
city seven years before.
3. 362 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1978), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Evidence, 40 LA. L. REV. 779, 781-,
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1978-79 Term].
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
crime evidence in proving such specific intent outweigh its pre-
judicial effect, in that the jury may because of the prior incidents
(and the defect of character thus exhibited) find such specific in-
tent for the present beating, whatever its circumstance (no mat-
ter how light the blow may have been, for example)?4
Answering in the negative, the majority said it entertained doubt as
to the relevancy of the other crimes. In its holding, the court stated,
"Ultimately, we conclude that, whether or not so probative, its pre-
judicial effect far outweighs whatever probative value it might have
in such respect, especially if the state (as it indicates) intends to go
into extensive detail as to the circumstances of the previous offenses."5
It seems to these writers that the approach suggested in the re-
cent case of State v. McKeever' is strikingly dissimilar from that taken
by the court in the Morris case. The defendant in McKeever was
charged with the shotgun murder of her "common law" husband. Ap-
parently not denying that she had shot the victim, the defendant set
up intoxication and insanity as a defense. The court, speaking through
Justice ad hoc Kliebert, found that no error had been committed by
the trial court in permitting the prosecution, on cross-examination of
the defendant, to adduce evidence that the defendant had been con-
victed (apparently several years previously) of the negligent homicide
of another "common law" husband under similar circumstances.7
Although holding that the prosecutorial action was proper impeach-
ment evidence under State v. Jackson,8 the court in McKeever went
on to state that the evidence would have been admissible apart from
the impeachment purpose to show the intent required for murder.
In the opinion of the writers, this language in McKeever seems to be
contrary to the holding in State v. Morris and is subject to serious
criticism, particularly so when it is considered that as to the earlier
crime, McKeever had not been charged with murder, but only with
manslaughter. Pursuant to a plea bargain in that case, she had been
convicted of negligent homicide.' There is no suggestion that McKeever
had a diabolical plan or system to liquidate lovers, and the fact that
some time previously she may have shot and killed another "common
4. 362 So. 2d at 1382.
5. Id.
6. 407 So. 2d 662 (La. 1981).
7. The negligent homicide conviction, it appears, had resulted from a plea bargain
arranged in response to a manslaughter charge. The trial court precluded the pros-
ecution from bringing this circumstance to the attention of the jury.
8. 307 So. 2d 604 (La. 1975). See text at notes 54-63, infra, for a discussion of
this case.
9. See note 7, supra.
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law" husband under similar circumstances has insufficient relevance,
it is believed, to be admissible as tending to show that she specifical-
ly intended to kill the instant "common law" husband.
Other Crime Evidence to Show Identity
State v. Humphrey"0 is a very disturbing case. In the post-Prieur,
pre-Humphrey decisions, the court took great pains to spell out the
circumstances under which other crime evidence is admissible to show
identity. The identity exception to the other crime exclusionary rule
is one of the most challenging categories to delineate and one of the
most dangerous. Despite the inherent difficulty involved, the court,
by persistent efforts, carefully traced the contours of the exception
and, in the process, narrowly limited its scope." In the opinion of the
writers, this approach is sound, for otherwise there is great danger
that trial courts may relapse into the relaxed pre-Prieur approach
to other crime evidence. 2
When the facts of State v. Humphrey3 were considered by the
court the third time, the majority seemed to abandon the effort to
delineate clearly the contours of the identity exception and instead
seemed to take a noncategorical general balancing approach, i.e., the
court seemed to hold that where evidence is highly relevant to show
identity of the malefactor, the trial court is to consider the particular
facts and circumstances of each case and determine whether, in con-
text, the probative value of the evidence outweighs the risk of undue
prejudice.
The facts in Humphrey were challenging indeed. Two small il-
legitimate children were battered to death, and the prime suspects
were their natural parents. In the case against the father for
manslaughter of the children, the supreme court upheld the admissi-
bility of evidence indicating that about four days prior to their death,
their father had slapped and beaten them about the face and head. 4
10. 412 So. 2d 507 (La. 1982).
11. See State v. Hatcher, 372 So. 2d 1024 (La. 1979), discussed in Pugh & McClelland,
Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Evidence, 41 LA. L. REV. 595, 598 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as 1979-80 Developments]; State v. Lewis, 358 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978), discussed
in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Term-Evidence, 39 LA. L. REV. 955, 962 (1979) (hereinafter cited as 1977-78 Term]; State
v. Frentz, 354 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1978), discussed in 1977-78 Term, supra, at 961; State
v. Lee, 340 So. 2d 1339, 1345 (La. 1976) (Dennis, J., concurring).
12. See Comment, supra note 2, at 614.
13. 412 So. 2d 507, 519 (La. 1982) (on rehearing). Earlier the case was before the
court on the same issue via writ of certiorari in State v. Humphrey, 381 So. 2d 813
(La. 1980).
14. For a case involving analogous but stronger facts supporting admissibility,
see State v. Lafleur, 398 So. 2d 1074 (La. 1981).
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Since the majority of the court concluded that evidence of the prior
beatings of the same children by the defendant a few days previously
was so relevant that it should have been admissible to show that he
committed the instant crimes, it seems to these writers that rather
than adopt a general balancing approach, it would have been preferable
to expand the already recognized categorical exception relative to the
admissibility, under certain circumstances, of other sex offenses with
the same party. 5 It is to be hoped that in the future, the Humphrey
approach, if not abandoned, will be narrowly limited to cases involv-
ing analogous facts.
Prieur Safeguards-Necessity for Limiting Instruction for Res Gestae
Crimes
One of the safeguards as to other crime evidence listed in State
v. Prieur6 is that in the court's final charge to the jury, it shall be
instructed as to the limited purpose of the other crime evidence. Is
this safeguard applicable where the other crime evidence in question
is admissible as part of the res gestae? State v. Donahue7 holds in
the negative. Although such an automatic instruction is not required,
presumably the defendant is entitled to an instruction if he requests it.
Prieur Safeguards-Necessity for Advance Written Notice Where Other
Crime Evidence is Admissible to Show Motive
State v. Prieur'8 did not list motive as one of the exceptions to
the other crime exclusionary rule, but later cases have so recognized
it. 9 Is the written notice requirement of State v. Prieur applicable
to crimes admissible under this motive exception? In a very persuasive
opinion in State v. Goza, ° the court holds in the affirmative. The
authors fully agree. All of the reasons underlying the notice require-
ment in Prieur are equally applicable to this situation."
15. See State v. Acliese, 403 So. 2d 665 (La. 1981), including a forceful dissent-
ing opinion by Chief Justice Dixon.
There is a close analogy between sex crimes and child beating. See State v. Com-
eaux, 319 So. 2d 897 (La. 1975), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Loui-
siana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 609 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1975-76 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 546 (Supp.
1978).
16. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
17. 408 So. 2d 1262 (La. 1982).
18. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
19. See the foundation case of State v. Abercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170 (La. 1979),
discussed in 1979-80 Developments, supra note 11, at 599.
20. 408 So. 2d 1349 (La. 1982).
21. As to which crimes are properly classified as fitting under the res gestae
exception to Prieur, see State v. Schwartz, 354 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1978), discussed in
1977-78 Term, supra note 11, at 961.
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Prieur Safeguards- Whether Necessary When Other Crime Evidence
Used for Impeachment
In State v. Feeback,22 a drug case, the defendant's witness on direct
examination stated that in the twelve years she had known the defen-
dant, he "had never distributed drugs to her.""3 Thereafter, on rebut-
tal, over the defendant's protest, the prosecution adduced testimony
that the rebuttal witness had seen the defendant distribute drugs to
the defense witness. The court held that the failure of the prosecu-
tion to have given a Prieur notice was of no moment because "[n]o
notice is required to be given defendant of evidence offered to im-
peach the credibility of a witness."24 Such broad language seems to
run counter to the earlier case of State v. Ghoram 5
In the opinion of the writers, under the circumstances presented
in Feeback, it may well have been proper for the prosecution, without
having given notice, to introduce the rebuttal evidence in question.
The defendant had "opened the door," and fairness seems to dictate
that in this situation the prosecution should have been permitted to
meet the testimony." On the other hand, if the matter first had been
inquired into by the prosecution, it is believed that an opposite result
should have followed, as it did in State v. Ghoram." In Ghoram the
court stated, "We hold that the rules applicable to the introduction
of prior offenses under R.S. 15:445 and 15:446 apply at every stage
of the trial, including the State's cross-examination or rebuttal."28
RELEVANCY- CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Character of the Victim
Character of the victim is a difficult, recurring problem,' and State
v. Bryan" is an interesting case concerning it. The defendant was con-
victed of murdering a deputy sheriff when the latter came to take
22. 414 So. 2d 1229 (La. 1982).
23. Id. at 1236.
24. Id. at 1237.
25. 290 So. 2d 850 (La. 1974), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 527
(1975) [hereinafter cited as 1973-74 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 99
(Supp. 1978).
26. See State v. Betancourt, 351 So. 2d 1187 (La. 1977), discussed in 1977-78 Term,
supra note 11, at 965.
27. 290 So. 2d 850 (La. 1974). See also State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1179 (La. 1981).
28. 290 So. 2d at 853.
29. See State v. Lee, 331 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976); Note, Character and Prior Conduct
of the Victim in Support of a Plea of Self Defense, 37 LA. L. REV. 1166 (1977), reprinted
in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 62 (Supp. 1978).
30. 398 So. 2d 1019 (La. 1981).
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him into custody. The defendant's defense was based on a contention
that he had killed the deputy in self-defense and, alternatively, that
the killing was "committed in a 'heat of passion' provoked by [the
deputy sheriff's] misconduct."31 In his case in chief, the defendant ad-
duced evidence tending to show that the deputy sheriff had acted
in a brutal fashion, using excessive force in making the arrest. In a
per curiam decision on original hearing, the court stated that by this
action the defendant "indirectly placed" the victim's character at issue.
With deference, it is submitted that the defendant's evidence tend-
ing to show that the victim used brutal and excessive force at the
time of the alleged crime in question should not have been considered
as placing the victim's character in issue, 32-directly or indirectly-
and this was recognized by a majority of the court in its opinion on
rehearing, authored by Justice Lemmon. 31 As the phrase "putting
character in issue" is generally used in this and similar contexts,34
it means attempting to establish conduct on a particular occasion by
showing the kind of person the actor is or, phrased differently, the
character he possesses. Merely depicting the conduct of the deputy
sheriff on the occasion in question as brutal and excessive is not this
kind of evidence, although, of course, it may have had the incidental
effect of implying that the victim was not a nice person.
In the opinion of the writers, since the defendant's action should
not have been regarded, in a technical sense, as placing the victim's
character in issue, it is questionable indeed as to whether the prose-
cution, in rebuttal, had the right to initiate inquiry into the character
of the victim by offering evidence by the sheriff as to the victim's
character.' In any event, even if the prosecution had been authorized
31. Id. at 1021 n.2.
32. See LA. R.S. 15:482 (1950).
33. In this connection, Justice Lemmon stated, "The state had initially placed at
issue the question of [the deputy sheriffs] general reputation in this regard, and the
evidence sought to be presented at the hearing on the motion for a new trial could
have impeached the sheriffs testimony." 398 So. 2d at 1022.
34. See LA. R.S. 15:479-483 (1950); FED. R. EVID. 404; C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE S 187, at 443 (2d ed. 1972).
35. Unlike Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a)(2), no statute in Louisiana expressly
authorizes the prosecution to initiate an inquiry into character under such circumstances,
and an implication may be drawn from LA. R.S. 15:479-483 that the prosecution may
not properly do so. (For a possible inference to this effect, see State v. Lejeune, 116
La. 193, 40 So. 632 (1906)). Despite criticism, see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 34, S 193;
1 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW S 63
n.2 (3d ed. 1940), it appears that prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, a majority
of American jurisdictions precluded such an inquiry. See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra, S 63
n.2; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE S 404[06], at 404-43 (1981); An-
not., 34 A.L.R.2d 451 (1954). In the opinion of the writers, a very forceful argument
can be made in favor of the traditional American approach.
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under the circumstances to go into the victim's character, the sheriffs
testimony, by going much beyond general reputation, seemed to these
writers to have gone far beyond the permissible ambit of acceptable
testimony.' Instead of being restricted to general reputation, it went
into the witness's personal opinion of the victim's character and the
absence of complaints of similar instances in the past. The evidence
in this connection was very damaging indeed to the defendant. 7 On
rehearing, the court stated that "the sheriffs testimony probably had
a devastating effect on the credibility of defendant's assertions of
violent and aggressive behavior by [the deputy sheriff] . . ... " No
objection, however, appears to have been made by the defense with
respect to the sheriff's testimony, and the supreme court therefore
was not called upon to hold one way or the other as to the propriety
of the prosecution's action.
On his unsuccessful motion in the trial court for a new trial, the
defendant "alleged prior threats against defendant, along with several
specific instances of police brutality on the part of [the deputy sheriff]
or complaints to the Sheriff concerning this deputy" 9 and sought
to present several witnesses who would testify that they had com-
plained to the sheriff about [the deputy sheriff's] brutality in the
course of arrests on prior occasions. He also sought to present
another witness who allegedly overheard [the deputy sheriff] say
that "he would get the defendant, Roger Bryan, one way or
another."40
The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court for an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine whether, under the circumstances, a new
trial should be ordered.
In the opinion of the writers, since the prosecution had initiated
the inquiry into the victim's character, the defendant should have been
able to meet the matter head on had he offered counter evidence at
the time.41 Aside from this, as recognized by the court in its opinion
36. See LA. R.S. 15:479 (1950). Character, whether good or bad, depends upon the
general reputation that a man has among his neighbors, not upon what particular per-
sons think of him. See also LA. R.S. 15:482 (1950); LA. R.S. 15:491 (1950) (relative to an
analogous inquiry); FED. R. EVID. 404.
37. The sheriff testified that the deputy sheriff in question "was a just and
temperate man who had never, to the witness' knowledge, mistreated arrestees." 398
So. 2d at 1020 (original hearing). The sheriff also testified that "during [the deputy
sheriff's] five years with the department he had never received any complaints about
abuse or mistreatment by [the deputy sheriff] or about [the deputy sheriff's] excessive
use of force in making an arrest." Id. at 1021 (rehearing).
38. Id. at 1021.
39. Id. at 1020 (original hearing).
40. Id. at 1021-22.
41. See Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
19821
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on rehearing, the evidence was relevant to impeach the sheriffs
testimony and, in the opinion of the writers, should have been ad-
missible at least on that issue."2 The matter is particularly disturbing
in light of the fact that in oral argument on rehearing, the prosecu-
tion conceded that the sheriff "was erroneous in his testimony that
he had never received any complaint about [the deputy sheriffs]
conduct."4
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
Attorney as Witness
The fact that a person is an attorney in a case does not cause
him to be incompetent as a witness therein." Nevertheless, from the
standpoints of both ethics and the administration of justice, serious
problems may be presented if a person seeks or is called upon to
serve both as an attorney in the case and as a witness. 5 It has been
held that if a prosecuting attorney is to be a witness for the state
in a criminal case, the prosecution of the case should be left to some-
one else."6 What procedure is to be followed if defense counsel seeks
to call the prosecuting attorney to the stand as a witness and the
prosecuting attorney maintains that he is possessed of no relevant
testimony?47
In State v. Tuesno,48 defense counsel subpoenaed as a witness a
prosecuting attorney- presumably one other than the one prosecuting
the instant case-and the prosecution moved to have the subpoena
quashed on the grounds that the testimony sought to be elicited was
"hearsay, irrelevant, or a part of the District Attorney's work
product."49 Holding a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the
trial judge examined the prosecuting attorney, held his testimony ir-
1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 661 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1974-75
Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 159 (Supp. 1978).
42. See 1977-78 Term, supra note 11, at 964; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note
34, S 57, at 131 ("Inadmissible Evidence as Opening the Door"); 1 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 35, S 15.
43. 398 So. 2d at 1024 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
44. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2283; see State v. McCord, 340 So. 2d 317 (La. 1976).
45. See Gutierrez v. Travelers Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978),
and authorities cited therein.
46. See State v. Franks, 363 So. 2d 518 (La. 1978); State v. McCord, 340 So. 2d
317 (La. 1976).
47. See State v. Franks, 363 So. 2d 518 (La. 1978) (the defendant has the right
to call the district attorney as a witness where the district attorney is possessed of
relevant information).
48. 408 So. 2d 1269 (La. 1982).
49. Id. at 1271.
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relevant, and excused him from testifying. The action taken by the
trial judge and the procedure he followed was upheld on appeal.
Theprocedure followed by the trial court in Tuesno seems to be
an appropriate one, fairly and efficiently reconciling the conflicting
interests involved, and within the court's inherent power.' It seems
to these writers that it likewise is an appropriate procedure if the
attorney subpoenaed is the one charged with prosecuting the case."
EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Expert Witnesses-Right of Cross-Examination as to Qualifications
Brown v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. 2 is an interesting case under-
lining the fact that if a party tenders a witness as an expert, the
opposing party is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine
the witness as to the "extent of his qualifications and experience, his
partiality or interest in the case, and other relevant matters that may
effect [sic] the value that can be placed upon his opinions.""3 Because
the trial judge had stated he had accepted the witness as an expert
in a prior case and would accept him as such in the instant proceeding
and refused to accord the opposing party an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness along the lines indicated, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
granted writs, reversed the trial court's action, and authorized the re-
quested cross-examination.
ATTACKING CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
Prior Convictions-Details of the Crime
In the controversial case of State v. Jackson,' it was held that
in attacking the credibility of a witness, the cross-examiner could prop-
erly inquire into "the true nature of the offense" underlying a convic-
tion. In State v. Oliver,55 the court made clear that Jackson "must be
50. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 17.
51. The California legislature has adopted an analagous procedure to use when
one of the litigants seeks to call the judge in the case as a witness. CAL. EVID. CODE
703 (West 1966).
52. 413 So. 2d 183 (La. 1982).
53. Id. at 184.
54. 307 So. 2d 604 (La. 1975), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, Developments in
the Law, 1980-1981-Evidence, 42 LA. L. REV. 659, 665 (1982) [hereinafter cited at 1980-81
Developments]; Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REV. 567, 578 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1976-77
Term]; 1974-75 Term, supra note 41, at 662, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 171
(Supp. 1978).
55. 387 So. 2d 1154 (La. 1980), discussed in 1980-81 Developments, supra note 54,
at 665.
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narrowly, rather than broadly, construed.,' Now, in State v. Martin,5 7
the court on rehearing, in an opinion by Justice Dennis, makes clear
that even under Jackson a witness is not to be examined about "counts
of the indictment upon which he was not convicted."' The court said
that "although a careful prosecuting attorney will refrain"59 from
adverting to the indictment charging the offense underlying the prior
conviction, "prejudicial error does not occur under La. R.S. 15:495 upon
mere reference to an indictment count upon which the defendant was
convicted."" More significant, perhaps, is the court's unanimous pro-
nouncement that
[a]s Professor McCormick observes, the more reasonable practice,
minimizing prejudice and distraction from the issues, is the
generally prevailing one that beyond the name of the crime, the
time and place of conviction and the punishment, further details
such as the name of the victim and the aggravating circumstances
may not be inquired into."'
In the later case of State v. Connor,' the court said that "[mlinor details
of far ranging and irrelevant matters such as conditions of probation,
alleged but uncharged offenses and charges dropped in response to
a guilty plea may not be used to cast doubt on a defendant's
credibility."6 It found, however, that under the circumstances of this
case, inquiry concerning dropped charges did not constitute reversi-
ble error. In the opinion of the writers, Jackson is the source of in-
troduction of much inappropriate evidence and it is to be hoped that
in the not too distant future its unorthodox doctrine will be overruled.
Access to "Rap Sheets" of Prosecution Witnesses
In two very interesting cases, there were important pro-
nouncements concerning a criminal defendant's pretrial access to the
"rap sheets" of state witnesses. In a memorandum decision in State
v. Huffman," the court, relying on State v. Harvey,5 granted defen-
dant's writ application and without qualification, laconically stated,
"The defendant is entitled to receive copies of 'rap sheets' of state
56. 387 So. 2d at 1156.
57. 400 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1981).
58. Id. at 1075.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 43 at 88.
62. 403 So. 2d 678 (La. 1981).
63. Id. at 680.
64. 401 So. 2d 1187 (La. 1981).
65. 358 So. 2d 1224 (La. 1978).
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witnesses."" Further, in a concurring opinion in State v. Washington,67
Justice Calogero significantly opined that Brady v. Maryland8 requires
that if a defendant makes an appropriate pretrial request, the pro-
secution should "make an affirmative effort to obtain the requested
materials on essential witnesses, if they are otherwise inaccessible
to the defense."69
Reputation Testimony- "Neighborhood" Limitation
Where the veracity of a witness is sought to be attacked by show-
ing that "his general reputation for truth or for moral character is
bad,"7 the inquiry as to such reputation traditionally was limited to
his reputation in the community in which he lived.7' In an analogous
context-where the reputation evidence is offered to show commis-
sion-or noncommission of the charged criminal act-Louisiana law
speaks in terms of the reputation the person has "among his
neighbors."72 In the latter context, emphasizing changed living pat-
terns, the court in State v. Walker73 gave the word "neighbors" an
expanded interpretation. This approach was continued in State v.
Clark," where the court, in light of modern trends and authorities,
took the position that
proof may be made not only of the reputation of the person where
he lives, but also of his repute, as long as it is "general" and
established, in any substantial community of people among whom
he is well known, such as the group with whom he works, does
business or goes to school."
Character Witnesses-Awareness of Report of Defendant's
Unconstitutionally Obtained Convictions
It is now well established that a witness may not be impeached
by an unconstitutionally obtained conviction." It has also been held
that to attack a character witness's knowledge and standard of reputa-
tion, a witness may be asked whether he has heard about the defen-
dant's arrest for a pertinent crime, where the proper safeguards have
66. 401 So. 2d at 1187.
67. 407 So. 2d 1138 (La. 1981).
68. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
69. 407 So. 2d at 1150.
70. LA. R.S. 15:490 (1950).
71. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 34, S 191 at 456.
72. LA. R.S. 15:479 (1950).
"73. 334 So. 2d 205 (La. 1976), discussed in 1976-77 Term, supra note 54, at 571-72.
74. 402 So. 2d 684 (La. 1981).
75. Id. at 687.
76. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972); State v. Bernard, 326 So. 2d 332 (La. 1976).
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been followed.7 7 Should it also be held that a character witness may
be asked whether he has heard that the defendant has been convicted
of another crime where in fact that conviction had been obtained in
violation of the defendant's right to counsel? The problem is an in-
triguing one and can be forcefully argued either way.
In State v. Williams,7 in an opinion authored by Justice ad hoc
Jones, the court, reasoning analogically from the cases dealing with
reports of prior arrests, held that, assuming proper safeguards are
complied with, a character witness may be asked whether he had
heard about an unconstitutionally obtained conviction. In the opinion
of the writers, it would have been preferable for the Louisiana court
to have precluded such a question." To let this testimony in is to
twice scar the defendant by the unconstitutional conviction earlier ob-
tained by the state. Rather than thus reap the benefits of an un-
constitutional conviction, the prosecution, it is believed, should have
been forced to content itself with asking the character witness whether
he had heard of the presumably constitutional arrest and should not
have been permitted to ask about the unconstitutionally obtained
conviction.
Prior Inconsistent Statements-Foundation Requirement
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:493 provides that before a witness's
credibility may be attacked by extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsis-
tent statement, the witness "must first be asked whether he has made
such statement, and his attention must be called to the time, place
and circumstances, and to the person to whom the alleged statement
was made." State v. Lafleur"° seems to these writers to represent an
excessively strict application of the rule.
Both the defendant and the woman with whom he was living had
been charged in connection with the death of the woman's child, and
the woman testified on behalf of the prosecution at the trial of the
defendant. Apparently, her testimony was extremely damaging to the,
defendant. On cross-examination by defense counsel, the woman con-
ceded that she had pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was asked
whether she remembered, while in the parish jail, "telling an inmate
there that [the defendant] had absolutely nothing to do with the
killing."'" She answered in the negative and persisted in her denial,
77. State v. Johnson, 389 So. 2d 372 (La. 1980), discussed in 1980-81 Developments,
supra note 54, at 659-60.
78. 410 So. 2d 217 (La. 1982).
79. Other jurisdictions have taken this position. See Houser v. State, 234 Ga. 209,
214 S.E.2d 893 (1975); Taylor v. State, 273 Md. 150, 360 A.2d 430 (1976).
80. 398 So. 2d 1074 (La. 1981).
81. Id. at 1078.
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despite firm warnings by defense counsel that he would "produce
witnesses who will say that you told them that [the defendant] had
absolutely nothing to do with it.""2 Further, the witness denied that
she had implicated the defendant in the crime because he had
mistreated her while they were living together. Holding that defense
counsel had not laid a proper foundation, the trial court precluded
the defendant from adducing the testimony of the impeaching witness.
The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and appealed.
Affirming the conviction, the supreme court agreed with the trial court
that the defendant had failed to lay the requisite foundation. The court
specified that defense counsel had not called the witness's attention
to the time and place83 of the alleged statement, the person to whom
the remark was made, or the circumstances under which the state-
ment was uttered. Further, the supreme court noted that although
defense counsel had spoken of witnesses, only one witness was in-
volved.
In the opinion of the writers, the reasons underlying the founda-
tion requirement were substantially satisfied, i.e., the information im-
parted to the witness was sufficiently precise to remind her of the
alleged statement, to give her an opportunity to admit it, and to pre-
vent her and the prosecution from being "sand-bagged" by surprise
production." Perhaps the law is justified in requiring the strictest
foundation as to a chance remark of a less material character-one
that might easily be forgotten if not very specifically called to the
witness's attention-and this is especially so where the remark is
about a peripheral matter in the case. In the instant case, however,
it is unthinkable to these writers that in the face of such a founda-
tion, the witness would not recall the statement if she had made it-
unless she had made so many like statements that she was unable
to recall and identify the precise one referred to by defense counsel.
The witness to be impeached was a critical one for the prosecution,
and refusing to let defense counsel adduce the testimony in question
seems particularly inappropriate when it is recalled that this was a
murder case and that the prosecution witness in question was highly
82. Id.
83. The impeaching witness was a trustee in the jail and had broader access than
most to places in the jail.
84. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 34, S 37. It is interesting that the Federal Rules
of Evidence have adopted a much more relaxed approach to this problem. See FED.
R. EVID. 613(b) & advisory committee note. Rule 613(b) provides: "Extrinsic evidence
of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness
is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is af-
forded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice other-
wise require." For a discussion of the federal approach, see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 35, S 613[04].
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suspect in light of the fact that she had apparently pleaded guilty
to manslaughter of the very same victim, presumably in consequence
of a plea bargain. The defendant maintained that the impeaching
witness was his most important witness and implied that the prosecu-
tion witness bore animosity toward the defendant. Under the cir-
cumstances, to deny the defendant the opportunity to attack the
witness's credibility by adducing the very damaging and highly rele-
vant prior inconsistent statement raised serious questions as to
whether the defendant was denied his constitutional rights of con-
frontation and compulsory process."5
Prior Inconsistent Statement-Right to Judicial In Camera Inspection
of Prosecution Witnesses' Prior Statements
A long line of cases have dealt with efforts by defense counsel
in criminal cases to gain access to pretrial statements by prosecution
witnesses for use in cross-examination of such witnesses.8" Of great
importance in this development was Justice Tate's concurring opinion
in State v. Babin.87 In State v. Davenport,88 an opinion authored by
Justice ad hoc Swift (one justice dissenting), the court makes it clear
that a defendant who makes a timely specific request has a broad
right to a judicial in camera inspection of written or recorded
statements obtained by the state from prosecution witnesses. The in
camera inspection is to be used to determine materiality of the
statements and possible "inconsistencies with . . . trial testimony or
other evidence favorable to the accused." 8
SUPPORTING CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
Rehabilitation of Witnesses-Prior Consistent Statements
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:496" provides that if a witness's
testimony has been "assailed," prior consistent statements made at
an unsuspicious time are admissible to corroborate the witness's
85. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973).
86. See State v. Babin, 319 So. 2d 367 (La. 1975); G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 681-91
(1974) & 628 (Supp. 1978).
87. 319 So. 2d 367, 372 (La. 1975), discussed in 1979-80 Developments, supra note
11, at 603; 1975-76 Term, supra note 15, at 592, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1,
at 628 (Supp. 1978).
88. 399 So. 2d 201 (La. 1981). See also State v. English, 400 So. 2d 1389 (La. 1981).
89. 399 So. 2d at 204.
90. LA. R.S. 15:496 provides: "When the testimony of a witness has been assailed
as to a particular fact stated by him, similar prior statements, made at an unsuspicious
time, may be received to corroborate his testimony."
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testimony. Importantly, however, the very next article, 15:497,91
appears to limit the broad applicability of 15:496 by specifying that
where a witness has been impeached by a prior inconsistent state-
ment, a prior consistent statement is admissible only if there has been
a claim of recent fabrication or "improper or interested motive," in
which case the prior consistent statements, to be admissible, must
have been made prior to the occasion giving rise to the alleged motive
to falsify. 2
Relying on Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:496 and State v. St.
Amand,93 and not mentioning 15:497,9" the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal, in Baltzar v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,95 stated that a prior
91. LA. R.S. 15:497 provides:
Evidence of former consistent statements is inadmissible to sustain a witness
who has been impeached by proof of former inconsistent statements, unless his
testimony be charged to have been given under the influence of some improper
or interested motive, or to be a recent fabrication, in which case, in order to
repel such imputation, it is proper to show that the witness made a similar state-
ment at a time when the supposed motive did not exist and the effect of such
statement could not be foreseen. But when a witness has been impeached by
evidence of declarations inconsistent with his testimony, he can not be corroborated
by statements made subsequent to such declarations.
92. For a discussion of the impact of the improper motive-recent fabrication claim,
see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 34, S 49. See also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) & advisory com-
mittee notes. For a critical analysis of LA. R.S. 15:496-497, see Note, Rehabilitation
of Witnesses in Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 286 (1938).
93. 274 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973).
94. State v. St. Amand had also failed to mention LA. R.S. 15:497. Instead, the court
relied on State v. Waggoner, 39 La. Ann. 919, 3 So. 119 (1887) and State v. Fontenot,
48 La. Ann. 283, 19 So. 113 (1896).
In Waggoner, in upholding the prosecution's efforts to introduce a prior corroborative
statement, the court noted that
[tihe object of the defense was to impair the force and effect of the boy's testimony
by showing that he had previously denied any knowledge of the homicide, and
that his statements on the trial were the result either of corrupt influences or
motives or of malice towards the accused.
39 La. Ann at 922, 3 So. at 120. The court relied in part on Wharton's Criminal Evidence
and noted that "On the other hand, where the opposing case is that t6e witness testified
under corrupt motives, or where the impeaching evidence goes to charge the witness
with a recent fabrication of his testimony, it is but proper that such evidence be rebut-
ted." 39 La. Ann. at 922, 3 So. at 121 (quoting F. WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES S 492).
In Fontenot, although the court did not clarify exactly under what circumstances
a prior consistent statement should be admissible to corroborate, the court emphasized
the importance of the consistent statement having been made prior to the alleged
prior inconsistent statement. The court stated: "We think that, where evidence has
been offered tending to show bias, improper motive, or recent fabrication on the part
of a witness, statements accounting for the testimony given, made prior to the con-
tradition proved on the other side, is [sic] admissible." 48 La. Ann. at 285, 19 So. at
114.
95. 406 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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consistent statement is admissible to support a witness's credibility
where the same has been "assailed" by a prior inconsistent statement.
The court placed no limitation whatsoever upon the reception of prior
consistent statements of a witness whose testimony had been "assailed" -
not even specifying, as does 15:496, that the prior consistent statement,
to be admissible, must have been given at an unsuspicious time. Although
the prior consistent statement in question was presumably given prior
to the time of the alleged inconsistent statement (a statement made
during the course of a deposition), it does not appear to have been
given at an unsuspicious time. It was made two days after the acci-
dent by one who, it appears, was employed by the railroad, and the
statement was self-serving in character. It appears to these writers
that the earlier St. Amand case was overly broad in its general state-
ment and the holding in Baltzar that the prior consistent statement
was admissible is questionable.
WITNESSES-RIGHT TO PREPARE FOR TRIAL
Pretrial Right to be Furnished Names of Witnesses
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a defen-
dant is not entitled to "statements made by the witnesses or pro-
spective witnesses, other than the defendant, to the district attorney,
or to agents of the state."" In addition to immunizing from discovery
similar materials of the defense, article 728 expressly provides that
the defendant shall not be required to furnish "the names of defense
witnesses or prospective defense witnesses." Is it to be inferred that
the trial court, under appropriate circumstances in advance of trial,
may order the prosecution to furnish the names of persons it plans
to call as witnesses or, even more broadly, the names of persons it
has interviewed in connection with the case? The matter was before
the court in State v. Walters.97
In Walters, the defendant, a police officer, had been charged with
negligently shooting persons at a Mardi Gras parade in New Orleans.
Not surprisingly, he foresaw great difficulty in securing the names
of witnesses to the alleged incident and requested that the prosecutor
provide him with "the names and addresses of all witnesses inter-
viewed by the district attorney's office and/or any other state
agency."9 Analyzing the comparable provisions in the statutes, the
court stated, "On the basis of simple statutory construction, the dif-
ference is obvious and there seems to be, therefore, an intentional
96. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 723.
97. 408 So. 2d 1337 (La. 1982).
98. Id. at 1338 n.1.
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legislative disclaimer on the state's discovery of the names of witnesses
which is not paralleled as relates to defense discovery."" In affirming
the action of the trial judge, a divided court, noting the special cir-
cumstances of the case, relied upon the discretion of the trial court
and stated, "It has long been a mainstay of concepts of fundamental
fairness, due process and the constitutional right to counsel that a
defendant and his attorney have the opportunity to prepare adequately
for trial.""'
In the later per curiam decision in State v. Washington,'01 the
members of the court indicated that State v. Walters is to be given
narrow scope. In reversing the judgment of the trial court ordering
the prosecution to furnish the defense with the names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of state witnesses, the majority of the Washington
court stated:
In the cases before us there was no determination that there exist
peculiar and distinctive reasons why fundamental fairness dictates
discovery. Nor does the record reflect any such showing by the
defendant. Therefore we reverse the ruling of the trial judge and
return the cases to the district court for re-trial of the discovery
motions.0 '
From Washington, it follows that for the defendant to gain the right
to such discovery, he will have to make a strong showing of need,
as in Walters.
PRIVILEGE
Forcing Assertion Before Jury
If trial counsel knows that a person would assert a valid privilege
not to testify if called as a witness by him, but believes that whether
or not so permitted by law,' the jury, if it knows of the assertion
of privilege, is likely to -draw an inference therefrom favorable to his
client, may counsel'properly force the witness to assert the privilege
in open court?
99. Id. at 1340.
100. Id.
101. 411 So. 2d 451 (La. 1982).
102. Id. at 451.
103. See LA. CODE'CRIM. P. arts. 770 & 771; State v. Bennett, 357 So. 2d 1136 (La.
1978); Note, The Use of A Witness's Privilege for the Benefit of A Defendant, 37-LA.
L. REV. 1244, 1246 (1977), and cases and authorities cited therein. See also FED. R. EViD.
513, as promulgated by the United States Supreme Court but not adopted by Con-
gresi 56 F.R.D. 183, 260 (1972).
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State v. Day"' concerns an aspect of this problem. In broad, em-
phatic language, the court in Day held that if the prosecutor knows
that a criminal defendant's wife would assert her privilege not to
testify against her husband," 5 he may not force her to assert the
privilege before the jury, nor may he use the fact of such a claimer
of privilege as the basis for arguing that adverse inferences should
be drawn against the defendant. In so holding, the court relied on
recent Louisiana cases " and on "minimum standards" adopted by the
American Bar Association." 7 Language in the opinion indicates that
the same rule would also apply to analogous action by defense counsel
in a criminal case.
Although the writers fully agree with the holding in the instant
case, they seriously question whether the same rule should inexorably
apply against a defendant in a criminal case, who, because of privilege
created by the state, is thwarted from adducing relevant reliable
evidence in his defense. Under certain circumstances, to deny the
defendant at least the benefit of an inference flowing from the asser-
tion of privilege might violate his constitutional right to compulsory
process.' Although by no means clear, there is arguably an indica-
tion in the later case of State v. Johnson"' that a different rule might
be adopted if the defendant in a criminal case is prevented from ad-
ducing relevant, material evidence by a prospective witness's valid
claimer of a privilege against self-incrimination.
Another question of considerable interest is whether the court
will adopt a similar rule in civil cases-whether a litigant will be
barred from forcing privilege assertion in open court or arguing that
adverse inferences may be drawn from a witness's claimer of
privilege."' Further, what rules are to be applied when the person
104. 400 So. 2d 622 (La. 1981). See also State v. Smith, 408 So. 2d 1110 (La. 1981);
State v. Thomas, 406 So. 2d 1325 (La. 1981).
105. LA. R.S. 15:461(2) (1950).
106. State v. Bennett, 357 So. 2d 1136 (La. 1978), discussed in 1977-78 Term, supra
note 11, at 978; State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975), discussed in 1975-76 Term,
supra note 15, at 598, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 237 (Supp. 1978); State
v. Haynes, 291 So. 2d 771 (La. 1974), discussed in 1973-74 Term, supra note 25, at 542,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 214 (Supp. 1978).
107. NATIONAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARD RELATING TO PROSECUTION FUNCTION S 5.7(c) & STANDARD
RELATING TO DEFENSE FUNCTION S 7.6(c) (1972).
108. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); 1975-76 Term, supra note 15, at 586,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 165 (Supp. 1978); 1973-74 Term, supra note 25,
at 538, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 168 (Supp. 1978). Note, supra note 103,
at 1250.
109. 404 So. 2d 239 (La. 1981).
110. See generally Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Marine Midland Bank
v. John E. Russo Produce Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31, 405 N.E.2d 205, 427 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980);
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asserting the privilege is himself a party litigant?.'
Attorney-Client Privilege-Statements to Non-Lawyer Prison Inmate
Legal Advisor
If a non-lawyer inmate in a public correctional facility is assigned
to its law library to assist fellow inmates with their legal problems
by "writing letters, preparing pleadings, and otherwise giving them
whatever advice he could," are statements made to such a person to
be clothed with the protection of the attorney-client privilege? This
was the fascinating question presented to the court in State v. Spell."2
Noting that the fellow inmate was not an attorney and that this fact
was known to the defendant, the court denied the claim of privilege.
In so holding, the court relied in part on State v. Lassai,"' wherein
a communication to a non-physician, non-social worker counsellor in
a drug abuse center was held not to be privileged.
With deference, it is submitted that the communication in Spell
should have been accorded privileged status. Unlike State v. Lassai,
the privilege at issue was a common law privilege"' which existed
independently of statute and one that was entitled to very high pro-
tection indeed. Extending the attorney-client privilege slightly to cover
this type communication would implement the reasons underlying the
privilege. Although not licensed as an attorney, the inmate counsellor
had been placed in the library by state authorities to serve a func-
tion otherwise performed by an attorney, and there was no indica-
tion in the opinion that the subject matter of the communication in
question was not within the ambit of the duties assigned to him.
Further, confidence is important to the relationship with an inmate
counsellor, much as it is to the relationship with an attorney counsellor.
If a state institution provides a non-lawyer inmate counsellor and has
him do the sort of things a lawyer does,"5 should not the communica-
tions made to him be similarly privileged? If society is not to accord
a privilege to such communications with an inmate counsellor, it may
have to provide a licensed attorney for inmate consultation.
Nantz v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 290 N.C. 473, 226 S.E.2d 340 (1976); 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 35, S 2272 at 439 (rev. ed. 1961); FED. R. EVID. 513, as promulgated by the
United States Supreme Court but not adopted by Congress, 56 F.R.D. 183, 260 (1972).
111. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); 8 J. WIGOMRE, supra note 35,
S 2272 at 439 (rev. ed. 1961).
112. 399 So. 2d 551 (La. 1981).
113. 366 So. 2d 1389 (La. 1978).
114. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 34, SS 87 & 97.
115. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969).
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Informer Privilege-Identity of Informant
In a very interesting memorandum decision, State v. Fischbein,1 6
the court, in response to a writ application, directed the trial judge
to make an in camera inspection of "the file which was shown to the
defense counsel and make a determination as to whether the inform-
ant was a participant in the crimes charged."" 7 If the informant was
found to have been such a participant and the state did not abandon
its efforts to bring the defendant to trial, defense counsel was to be
notified of the identity of the informant prior to trial. This problem
is explored in depth in an able comment published earlier in this
review. 18
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination v. Right of a Criminally Accused
to Adduce Evidence-Availability of Use Immunity
Use immunity is a device available to the prosecution to over-
come a witness's claimer of the privilege against self-incrimination." 9
In light of a defendant's constitutional rights to compulsory process,12
due process, 21 and presentation of a defense,22 is a defendant, under
appropriate circumstances, similarly entitled to have a witness granted
use immunity? The matter has been the subject of recent considera-
tion by state 23 and federal2 courts and was again before the Loui-
siana Supreme Court in State v. Mattheson,25 a murder case
culminating in a death sentence. Although the court did not totally
reject the possibility of granting use immunity at the behest of the
defense, it stated that "a trial judge properly rejects a claim for
defense witness immunity whenever the witness for whom immunity
is sought is an actual or potential target of prosecution."126 This, of
course, is the area in which the problem is most likely to arise, and
it is noteworthy that the prosecution's facility to have a witness
granted use immunity is not similarly limited. The question is dif-
116. 406 So. 2d 590 (La. 1981).
117. Id. at 590.
118. Comment, Defendant's Right to a Confidential Informant's Identity, 40 LA. L.
REV. 147 (1979). See also Pugh, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, 1971-1972 Term-
Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 313 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1971-72 Term], reprinted
in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 187 (1974).
119. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 439.1; Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
120. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LA. CONST. art. I, S 16.
121. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1; LA. CONST. art. I, 5 2.
122. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); LA. CONST. art. I, S 16.
123. See the cases cited in 1977-78 Term, supra note 11, at 976 & 977 n.116.
124. See United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981); Government of
V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
125. 407 So. 2d 1150 (La. 1981).
126. Id. at 1161.
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ficult, challenging, and not yet resolved by the United States Supreme
Court. It is the subject of a perceptive student note in an earlier issue
of this review."
In his dissent in Mattheson, Justice Calogero argued strongly that
the case should have been remanded for the trial court to cbnduct
an evidentiary hearing at which the witness, if available, would be
granted use immunity. The'trial court then would endeavor to ascer-
tain whether "had the testimony of [the witness] been presented at
defendant's trial there would have been created a reasonable doubt
.about defendant's guilt which did not otherwise exist.""'
Secrecy of the Grand Jury-Defendant's Access to a Prosecution
Witness's Grand Jury Testimony
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 434(A), in strong
language, provides for secrecy of grand jury testimony, and in light
of its provisions, it was held in State v. Terrebonne"'l that the prose-
cution may not impeach a witness with his allegedly inconsistent grand
jury testimony. The statute and the decision in Terrebonne raise
manifold questions relative to a defendant's right to prepare for trial"
and his right to confront the witnesses arrayed against him. 1'
State v. Peters"' presents important aspects of this problem. In
application for writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court, defense counsel:
(1) maintained that the state's only eye-witness, in interviews with
him, stated that she had lied before the grand jury, (2) stated that
the witness in question had given permission for the defendant to
read her grand jury testimony, and (3) requested a pretrial inspec-
tion of the transcript of her testimony. Noting both Louisiana's statute
providing for secrecy of grand jury'33 testimony and the cases inter-
preting it, but noting also the United States Supreme Court decisions"'
relative to the prosecution's obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence
127. Note, Defense Witness Immunity-A "Fresh" Look at the Compulsory Process
Clause, 43 LA. L. REV. 239 (1982).
128. 407 So. 2d at 1174.
129. 256 La. 385, 236 So. 2d 773 (1970), discussed in Pugh, Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts, 1970-1971 Term-Evidence, 32 LA. L. REV. 344, 347 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as 1970-71 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 184 (1974).
130. See G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 614-28 (Supp. 1978).
131. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), discussed in 1978-74 Term, supra note
25, at 538, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 168 (Supp. 1978).
132. 406 So. 2d 189 (La. 1981). See also State v. Griffon, 406 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1981)
(mem.).
133. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 434(A).
134. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Giglio v. United States 405
U.S. 150 (1972); Brady .. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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(including prior inconsistent statements of certain witnesses), the court
through Justice Marcus concluded that "[a]n accused's constitutional
rights cannot be thwarted by state law." '35 To accommodate the state's
interest in the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings and the defen-
dant's rights of confrontation and due process, the trial court was
ordered to conduct an in camera inspection to determine whether the
witness's grand jury testimony was inconsistent with her statements
to the police and at motion hearings and whether the same was
material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The clear implica-
tion of this decision is that despite Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure article 434(A) and Terrebonne, if the prescribed test were met,
not only would the grand jury testimony be available to the defense
as a matter of discovery, under appropriate circumstances, it also
would be admissible at trial as a prior inconsistent statement.1 38
HEARSAY
State of Mind of the Victim
Another in the intriguing line of cases emanating from State v.
Raymond1" is the court's decision in State v. Spell,1 38 an opinion
authored by Justice ad hoc Jones. According to a confession introduced
by the prosecution, the defendant had killed the victim in order to
prevent him from telling the defendant's wife about the defendant's
homosexual relationship with the victim. Over the defendant's objec-
tion, the prosecution was permitted to introduce testimony by the
victim's half sister that approximately two weeks before the alleged
murder, the victim had told her that he was "in love with defendant"
and the defendant was "his homosexual lover." 39 The court, relying
on State v. Weedon,14 ° found that the statement involved was not ad-
missible under Raymond to show the state of mind of the victim
because the statement was not made a few hours before the killing
as in Raymond, but two weeks before. The court concluded, however,
that since another witness had testified that the defendant had con-
fessed to him the murder and the motive, the improper admission
of the evidence was "harmless error." The writers find it extremely
135. 406 So. 2d at 191.
136. LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950).
137. 258 La. 1, 245 So. 2d 335 (La. 1971), discussed in 1970-71 Term, supra note
129, at 353. See also State v. Doze, 384 So. 2d 351 (La. 1980), discussed in 1980-81
Developments, supra note 54, at 669; State v. Johnson, 381 So. 2d 436 (La. 1980), discussed
in 1979-80 Developments, supra note 11, at 613; State v. Weedon, 342 So. 2d 642 (La.
1977), discussed in 1976-77 Term, supra note 54, at 584.
138. 399 So. 2d 551 (La. 1981).
139. Id. at 555.
140. 342 So. 2d 642 (La. 1977), discussed in 1976-77 Term, supra note 54, at 584.
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difficult to regard the admission of the testimony as harmless. By
providing independent corroboration of portions of the defendant's
alleged confession, it was very damaging evidence indeed.""
Prior Inconsistent Statement and the Hearsay Rule
Louisiana has followed the traditional view that the prior incon-
sistent statement of a witness is not to be accorded substantive weight
but under certain circumstances,' it may be used to neutralize the
testimony given on the stand by the witness.' In re Clark'" is a
disturbing case bearing on this problem. In Clark, a child neglect case,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, citing certain modern authorities
outside Louisiana,'45 stated that statements taken by social workers
from persons who had testified in the case "even if hearsay in nature,
cannot be viewed as unreliable."'4 6 Although some of the statements
may have been admissible as admissions, the court in Clark appears
to be taking a very relaxed attitude indeed towards the hearsay rule,
one contrary to traditional Louisiana Supreme Court holdings.' 7
Judicial Confession-Binding Effect of Pleadings
The Louisiana Supreme Court has been frequently called upon
to determine the impact of Louisiana Civil Code article 2291 relative
to the binding effect of a judicial confession. 4" If the plaintiff alleges
in his petition that several persons-all named as defendants in the
lawsuit- negligently caused the injuries he complains of and he, prior
to trial, settles with some of the named defendants, is he, as to the
remaining defendants, bound by his allegations? Phrased differently,
when determining whether the remaining defendant is entitled to pro
rata deduction as to his liability for the amount of the damages, may
he (the remaining defendant) successfully invoke Civil Code article
141. See 1979-80 Term, supra note 11, at 622.
142. See LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950).
143. See State v. Kaufman, 304 So. 2d 300 (La. 1974), discussed in 1974-75 Term,
supra note 41, at 665, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 162 (Supp. 1978); State
v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971), discussed in 1971-72 Term, supra note 118,
at 311, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 104 (1974); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 34,
at 601. See also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) for a slight variation on the traditional rule.
As to the effect to be given in Louisiana to prior inconsistent statements, see State
v. Martin, 356 So. 2d 1370 (La. 1978), discussed in 1977-78 Term, supra note 11, at
911; State v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 467 (La. 1976), discussed in 1975-76 Term, supra
note 15, at 609.
144. 400 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
145. Id. at 338.
146. Id.
147. Compare In re Clark, 400 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) with State v.
Allien, 366 So. 2d 1308 (La. 1978).
148. See G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 437-44 (1974); 1978-79 Term, supra note 3, at 802.
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2291 to hold the plaintiff to his earlier allegations that the defendants
were collectively responsible for his injuries?
In Raley v. Carter,'9 a unanimous court, speaking through Justice
Blanche, held that the plaintiff was not so bound and stated that "[bly
its very nature, a plaintiff's petition places facts at issue. Only a defen-
dant may conclusively admit those allegations in the petition which
are adverse to his interest and, therefore, relieve the plaintiff of his
obligation to prove those allegations at trial." 50
Former Testimony-Identity of Issues
Is testimony that was given in a former possessory action by a
now-deceased surveyor admissible in a subsequent petitory action con-
cerning the same property and the same parties? In a valuable, well-
reasoned opinion authored by Judge Hall of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeal, collecting many of the authorities on the subject, the court
answers in the affirmative in Stutts v. Humphries.'5 ' Substantial iden-
tity of the issues with respect to the testimony in question is the
criterion, says the court; there need not be absolute identity.
Business Records-Computer Data
The admissibility of computer data as evidence has taken on in-
creased significance. The specialized requirements for admissibility of'
such data were helpfully set out by the court in an opinion authored
by Judge Norris of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, Vining v.
State Farm Life Insurance Co."'
Self-Authenticating Commercial Publications
In State v. Scramuzza,"' the supreme court approved the action
of the trial court in consulting a United States Post Office Zip Code
Directory at a motion to suppress hearing as to whether other streets
in the city of New Orleans bore the same or similar names as that
149. 412 So. 2d 1045 (La. 1982).
150. Id. at 1048. As to the effect of plaintiffs settling with codefendants after trial
has begun, see Danks v. Maher, 177 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), distinguished
in Raley v. Carter, 412 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (La. 1982).
151. 408 So. 2d 940 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981). For an earlier discussion on this same
subject, see Comment, The Admissibility of Former Testimony in Civil and Criminal
Trials, 20 LA. L. REV. 146 (1959), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 448 (1974). See
also G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 535-36 (Supp. 1978).
152. 409 So. 2d 1306 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982). For a decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court authorizing the admission of a computer printout under certain circumstances,
see State v. Hodgeson, 305 So. 2d 421 (La. 1974), discussed in 1974-75 Term, supra
note 41, at 671, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 1, at 542 (Supp. 1978).
153. 408 So. 2d 1316 (La. 1982).
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used in the search warrant. Relying on Federal Rules of Evidence
803(17) and 902(5), the court, in a significant passage in a footnote
stated, "Moreover, the zip code directory is the sort of commercial
publication which should be treated as a self-autheniticating document
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule."'54
PAROLE EVIDENCE -LOUISIANA'S "DEAD MAN STATUTE"
Louisiana's so-called Dead Man Statute' provides that when,
under its provisions, parole evidence is admissible to prove the "debt
or liability" of a person deceased, the evidence must consist of "the
testimony of at least one creditable witness other than the claimant,
and other corroborating circumstances." ' Who is the "claimant" for
these purposes? Specifically, if two persons join in a suit against a
succession, claiming that the decedent owed them certain monies, may
each be regarded as a "creditable witness other than the claimant"
in support of the demand of the other?
Savoie v. Estate of Rogers'57 clarifies this matter. The test, says
the court, is whether the plaintiffs assert a joint interest in the claim
or whether each has a separate claim. If they assert a joint claim,
then each is a "claimant" within the meaning of the statute. On the
other hand, if they assert separate claims against the decedent's estate
and have merely joined in the suit for the sake of convenience, the
fact that each, from a practical standpoint, is interested in establishing
the facts mutually supporting their respective claims does not cause
one to be disqualified from serving as a "creditable witness" as to the
claim of the other.
154. Id. at 1318 n.2.
155. LA. R.S. 13:3721-3722 (Supp. 1960). Louisiana's Dead Man Statute is narrower
than many of those found elsewhere in the country. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note
34; S 65; Note, Evidence-Applicability of Dead Man's Statute to Tort Action, 22 LA.
L. REV. 838 (1962).
156. LA. R.S. 13:3722.
157. 410 So. 2d 683 (La. 1981).
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